Different voluntary laws are in some sense “compatible” when consistent with the three pillars as defined earlier: personhood, voluntariness, and publication. A logical system for resolving conflict of laws follows by rational deduction from these core principles. There may be incompatible systems of voluntary law; for example, those that use an incompatible definition of person. Here a distinction must be made: systems that define personhood based on some arbitrary characteristic (for example, color of skin, language, eye color, beliefs, etc.) are not systems deserving of interest. They may arise and exist as backwards curiosities, but will not thrive in the face of universal definitions of personhood that rest on the corporeality of the individual, possession of a moral sense, and the capacity to understand, adopt, and follow rules governing resolution of conflicting rights or claims on a reasoned basis. There may exist debate about these fundamental prerequisites to personhood, and when they apply. Some issues of such debate were touched upon in an earlier chapter. Interesting real-world problems do arise, however, over treatment of “temporary” non-persons, such as minors or mentally disabled persons, treatment of collective entities, animal rights. More exotic questions such as artificial or alien life may deserve a little attention as future possibilities.
Speaking of fetuses, infants, children, or others incapable of looking after themselves, when is intervention justified in a caretaker-dependent relationship? What law should be applied to justify intervention, when the subject is incapable of adopting her own law? An ancillary question concerns what actions are justified when no legally responsible caretaker can be found for such a person. If every dependent person (or potential person) has an uncontested caretaker, who treats the dependent in a manner consistent with prevailing customs, legal controversies do not arise. Legal questions can arise chiefly when dependents are abandoned, are the subject of caretaker disputes, or are treated in a way that those willing to take defensive measures regard as abusive.
For purposes of voluntary law, we may divide dependency questions into two essential classifications: those in which the dependent was at least at some relevant time capable of functioning as a legal person, and those in which the dependent has never acted as a person in the legal sense and is reasonably regarded as lacking the capacity to do so for all relevant times. There may be, of course, controversy or doubt as to which class a person belongs to, or gradation along a spectrum from incapacity to capacity. Nonetheless, exploration of the legal middle ground depends from the opposite classifications that define its boundaries. We shall explore how voluntary law might work in the gray, intermediate zone between clear legal capacity and clear incapacity, after first considering how dependency works in the end conditions.
“Relevant times” means those times relevant to the legal question at hand. For example, in considering the validity of a power of attorney, the relevant time is that time when the power was granted. At some time afterwards, the grantor may be completely incapacitated (e.g., may be suffering from a severe brain disorder). The subsequent lack of capacity may not be relevant to the validity of the power, depending on its terms. For further example, the relevant time for an aborted fetus is the time up until abortion and death of the fetus.
A dependent relationship between two legally capable persons may take the form of a contract or agreement, a grant of power, a temporary agency or rendering of assistance or other circumstances in which one legally capable person depends on the actions of another. These relationships are easy to analyze. In a wholly voluntary law society, any controversies arising out of such dependencies are treated under the laws adopted by the participants, using some rational system for resolving conflicts of law, such as TROTWET. The capacity of a person to act in the adoption of law may be an issue in certain cases, just as is it conventionally for purposes of contracts, criminal intent, testamentary capacity, and in other cases. There are many different possible factual scenarios. For example, a dependent who previously adopted a first law ‘A’ and later ‘B’ might have the adoption of either ‘A’ or ‘B’ challenged. If there is sufficient evidence that the adoption was not made intentionally by the dependent while being in a mentally capable state, the adoption of law might be nullified by judicial action. For example, a later adoption of law ‘B’ might be nullified and the dependent’s law therefore might be considered to be ‘A’ and only ‘A’. If the adoption of law ‘A’ is also nullified, the dependent may fall into the status of a dependent outlaw, similar to a child who has never adopted any law. Treatment of dependent outlaws will be considered below.
First, however, consider the possibility of conflicts between the law of a non-outlaw dependent and the law of another person who acts as a caregiver. Such conflicts may come into play, for example, when the caregiver brings an action to spend assets belonging to the dependent for the dependent’s care, or for a declaration of property interest in the dependent’s estate. Conversely, another acting as a guardian under the dependent’s law might bring an action to recover damages from a negligent or abusive caregiver, or to seek termination of the caregiver relationship. In the sense used in this essay, a “guardian” should be understood as nothing more than a self-appointed legal representative who asserts the dependent’s law on behalf of a dependent. A “guardian” is not appointed by any jurist, and has no special powers to act on behalf of the dependent. In bringing a case before a jurist, the guardian bears the risk that the jurist will not interpret the applicable law in a way that favors the guardian, just as any other litigant.
Consider the result if the property claim or asset request is permitted under the caregiver’s law but not under the dependent’s, or vice-versa. In either case the claim will fail, under TROTWET. Naturally, this will create a shortage of payment for continuing care, if the dependent has not previously executed an agreement permitting the caregiver to spend the dependent’s property for the dependent’s care. Unless some legal action can be taken, a dependent who is incapacitated and unable to act on his own behalf will be deprived of the benefit of his own property. On the other hand, if the dependent’s law clearly preserves the estate to the detriment of continued care in the situation at hand, the jurist cannot assume that the dependent would prefer that the estate be wasted for continued care and not be inherited by an heir. In these cases, the legal effect of adopting a clear law on the question would be similar to the granting of a “durable power of attorney” or a “do not resuscitate” order, under the law of many U.S. states and other places. No person should be required to waste their estate on extraordinary care for the last days of life.
In case of action by a legal guardian under the dependent’s law against a caregiver, consider what happens if the recovery is permitted by the law of the dependent but not the caregiver, or vice-versa. In either case, the recovery is not permitted. Such an outcome can easily be guarded against before the disability arises, either by appropriate adoption of law or appropriate selection of a caregiver or class of caregiver, by the future dependent. For example, the dependent’s law might provide that no person can be regarded as the dependent’s appointed caregiver whose law does not adhere to specified minimum standards for caregivers. Thus, a person acting as an invalid caregiver would be vulnerable to claims of a general nature, e.g., trespass or assault, for care of a non-emergency nature.
Finally, we consider the treatment of dependent outlaws, of which the largest but not exclusive class consists of children. Dependency of a legally incapable outlaw on a legally capable society member raises various possibilities for determination of law. One possibility is to treat the relationship wholly under the law of the legally capable person, while treating the legally incapable person as an outlaw like any other. Under this approach, the poor dependent person in the relationship would be deprived legal recourse for abortions, infanticides, child abuse, euthanasia, kidnappings, and all manner of horrors heaped upon her. She would be treated under voluntary law as if she had consciously chosen to be an outlaw, despite lacking ability to escape by adopting a law. Such an approach would create incentives for abuses against children and other dependents. It is not worthy of serious consideration.
Another possibility is to apply the law of the caregiver, as if it were also adopted by the dependent. This is the nearest choice. Nearest perhaps, but applying the law of the caregiver to the rights of the dependent invites abuse by unscrupulous caregivers. At the same time, abuse is no less likely if a third person with some interest in the outcome of a dispute is empowered to craft the law governing the relationship between the caregiver and the dependent outlaw. For example, a rational parent would prefer to have no legal obligations to his children, and would be content to perform the duties of parenting under purely moral obligations such as felt by the parent’s conscience. Conversely, a rational person in the business of child protection (without state intervention, of course) would recognize the essential need for a standard of legal protection of children, to enable the activity of child protection to be legally recognized. Both classes of persons are capable of abuses, as well as good deeds.
There is really only one solution consistent with equal rights under natural law: to presume the child is person of good conscience who would not adopt a law against her self-interest, if she were capable of adopting any law. The alternative, to regard the child or other dependent as entitled to no more rights than the property of the caregiver until emancipation, is contrary to nature: children are plainly not equivalent to livestock, being of the same kind as those who care for them. Children are the fabric of future society, destined (with luck) to become equal participants in a society based on personal sovereignty and adoption of law. Livestock and other animals incapable of language do not share the destiny of children, and belong to a different class of being. In a system of law based on personal sovereignty, it is inconceivable that any child or immature person could be regarded as nothing more than the property of another. That is not to say that the relationship between a caregiver and a child cannot resemble a bilateral property interest, in some respects. Such a resemblance is indeed possible, as we shall see.
The question at hand is which law to apply to a dispute involving the rights of a child, when parties in conflict disagree about the law to be applied. There will always be some conflict between persons in such disputes, because a dependent (not emancipated) child will be incapable of bringing her own case. Put another way, a person of any age capable of bringing his own case, if it is truly his own without any legal claim of dependence on another, deserves to be regarded as a person with all the rights and responsibilities of self-sovereignty.
Conflicts touching directly on dependent children will often take the form of custodial disputes between estranged parents or relatives, and less frequently, allegations of parental abuse by child protection agencies, whether in the person of interested family members or neighbors, or as organized benevolent societies. Other cases may involve a dispute between the child and an adult. For example, the property rights of the child may be at play, or damages for an alleged wrong committed by or against a dependent child. We shall consider the first class of disputes first.
Assessing the weaker tool is based on comparing the burdens that a law places on the sovereign parties to a dispute. The underlying principle is that one cannot impose legal burdens on another that are not consented to, and that one would not accept for oneself, if the tables were turned. However, this principle does not hold when the object of the claim revolves around the rights of a dependent person who has not selected any of the laws to be assessed. If there is to be a weaker law selected, the analysis must not fail to consider the perspective of the dependent person, who has brought no claim.
Lacking any adopted law from the perspective of the dependent, if the dependent is to be regarded as a person, the jurist is compelled to consider what law a reasonable person in the circumstances of the dependent would adopt regarding the disposition of her rights, knowing that all the burdens and responsibilities of that same law would be applied to her if she were to someday become a parent. This imaginary law cannot be fabricated from nothing; it must be supported by credible evidence and be developed objectively by a neutral, unbiased jurist. It must not be standardized or imposed by some authority on community norms. On the contrary, the law that is imputed by the child must be reasonable, contextually appropriate and customized to the child’s individual circumstances, as determined by an independent, neutral and unbiased jurist.
Such an imaginary law might resemble norms of the community to which the child and her family belong. It might also bear a resemblance to the laws held by the disputants in the case. Finally, the stated preferences of the dependent child and her siblings, if she or they are capable of expressing any, cannot be ignored in the determination of such an imaginary law, provided that the preferences are drawn out in a balanced and unbiased way by a neutral counselor, or estimated in some objective way from statements of similarly situated persons (e.g., siblings or fellow travelers). For each person chooses law that fits their psychological preferences and is compatible with the community in which they are raised, and will raise their own children. When a dependent outlaw is incapable of choosing his own law, a jurist must do it for him, from the perspective of the dependent. Such a job will never be perfectly accurate, but nonetheless the justice of such estimations can be measured against standards such as suggested above, which is all that any law can do.
For example, circumcision may be considered conventional and desirable in some communities, and merely abusive in another. Suppose a pair of parents circumcise their child for cultural or religious reasons. Suppose that a grandparent who considers circumcision to be a grave form of child abuse unless medically necessary sues for guardianship of the child. Assignment of caretaker responsibility for circumcision is clearly justified under the law of the grandparent, but not recognized by the law of the parents. We might be tempted to recognize the law of the parents as the weaker tool, because it provides no remedy (change of guardianship) for the conduct complained of. But what if a severer form of trauma had been complained of? Can we really accept an absence of any legal remedy for caretaker abuse? Justice requires vision from the perspective of the child, so that the law that places the least burden on the child is the weaker tool. That would leave us wondering how to determine the “least burden,” in a circumstance without any lawmaker and thus, no justification for applying the weaker tool in the first place. More simply, we cannot rely on the natural balancing of interest normally provided by the Rule Of The WEaker Tool in an action that directly impinges on the dependent outlaw, because the consequences of holding a weak tool do not fall on the law maker, but on someone else – the child, who holds to no law.
Accordingly, the jurist must identify the law that the child or other dependent outlaw would most likely choose were it capable of reasoning through the benefits and burdens involved. This is a high degree of discretion, but a jurist who cannot reason persuasively and fairly in accord with the sensibilities of those who come to judgment will not be long in business. Suppose the child lived in a community where circumcision was considered to be as ugly and depraved as most today would consider cutting off of noses and ears, the parents who circumcise their child would likely suffer some penalty, such as paying for reconstructive surgery and loss of, or restrictions on, their caretaker status. Conversely, if the child’s community feels that circumcision is a desirable mark of honor or social belonging, there would be no remedy despite the opposition of the grandparents.
How can a jurist determine a law to be imputed to a fetus, or to an infant? Just as in other cases; except that statements of these dependents cannot be taken into account, because they are incapable of speech. Therefore the imputed law is mainly based on prevailing norms in the child’s community and the adopted laws of the persons at issue. In the case of a fetus, there is plainly no closer person to the fetus than the mother, so the laws of the mother cannot be lightly disregarded, and will likely prevail in the vast majority of cases.
What if a community believed it necessary to sacrifice children to some god or demon? If this were a community standard, must a jurist enforce it? This is a nonsensical question. A group of people who sacrificed children to the gods would not be a voluntary law society; it would be a group of outlaws who deny voluntary cooperation and use irrational fear and violence to oppress less privileged classes. Such outlaws would not submit to the jurisdiction of a voluntary law jurist, and the question would never arise. Nonetheless, somewhere between child sacrifice and circumcision lies a spectrum of parental behavior about with reasonable people might vehemently disagree. Corporeal punishment provides a good example: to some, corporeal punishment is an inexcusable crime, no matter how implemented; to others, is it a useful if not necessary means of discipline. When disputes arise about corporeal punishment of a child, a voluntary law jurist will weigh the three factors of community norms, interested caretaker beliefs, and dependent statements (perhaps among other reasonable factors) to determine the limits of corporeal punishment in particular cases, and what remedies to apply when the limits are exceeded, as if crafting the law that the dependent would craft for herself if she could. The judgment would be tailored to the individual circumstances of each case, including the underlying conduct, identities, and laws of the parties, community norms at the time, the age and statements of the defendants, and so forth.
The respect to which the judgment would be given would depend mainly, as always, on the strength of good reputation of the jurist, and the thoroughness and neutrality with which the record indicates that the case has been examined. Results would not be perfectly consistent (nor have perfectly consistent results ever been achieved by any system of justice), but on the whole would tend towards greater justice than is possible when imposing a uniform rule on controversial questions. Voluntary law permits diverse and conflicting opinions to coexist, with pressure towards uniformity coming mainly from the grassroots. It is not an instrument for imposing uniformity against opposition. Anyone publicly holding to a controversial law, however, will do so at the risk of her relationships with her community. There can be social pressure to conform, but no aggressive coercion requiring it.
If a law is imputed by a jurist to a dependent person, is that law then subject to moderation under TROTWET or other conflict resolution principle? Generally, the answer is no, assuming that the dependent is not a party to the action. Most actions involving dependents, except those in which the dependent is close to capable status (e.g., is a teenager) will be brought by a guardian against a caregiver. Suppose, for example, a guardian’s law provided for payment of the guardian’s reasonable expenses by the caregiver, if corporeal punishment by a caregiver is found to be abusive. Suppose that the caregiver’s law provides no such remedy, even in the event of abuse. If there were no dependent involved no damages would be assessed, but the caregiver would be vulnerable to attacks motived by vengeance as has been explained previously. Because the controversy revolves around the rights of the dependent outlaw, TROTWET does not apply. If the jurist determines that the dependent’s law requires payment by the caregiver for the guardian’s protective services, that will be the law applied.
The case of the intermediate-capable dependent is answered by the solution to the pure dependent: the statements of the dependent are given more weight in judicial determination of its law, as the dependent approaches the full capabilities of independent personhood. The teenager has more rights and responsibilities than the toddler. The other factors diminish in importance. Once the full capacity is personhood is reached, the jurist no longer determines the person’s law; the jurist merely reads and interprets what the person has adopted. Determination of capacity in the intermediate zone works like a sliding scale. These determinations may not always be exactly correct, but neither will they be far from a just result, and results in aggregate should tend towards justice.
A fully capable person may be recognized by the absence of any claim of dependency on another. If a precocious youngster is able to articulate and understand his own law, but not to support himself by his own wits and labor, he is not fully capable. His abilities and statements will be given weight, but to the full weight afforded to a voluntary law adopted by a capable and independent person.
If voluntary law can be imputed to the dependents of voluntary law society members, can voluntary laws also be imputed to the children or other dependents of outlaws? In a philosophical sense, yes. But in a practical sense, generally not. Regimes outside of voluntary law will have their own rules governing dependent persons, or will be lawless. In either case, there is no basis for bringing any adult person involved with the dependent unto a voluntary law forum. If an abandoned child of an outlaw somehow comes before a voluntary law forum, and a society member appears as an interested caretaker, the justifications for providing the dependent with the benefit of voluntary law are as valid as for the child of any society member. It is permissible to make provisions for the dependent within voluntary law, where the society of outlaws has broken down. It is equally valid to return the dependent to the society of outlaws, if there is no caretaker willing to bear the risk of caring for a dependent of outlaws.
Providing dependent outlaws with the protection of an imputed personal law might sometimes create a relationship of mutual servitude between a caregiver and a dependent. The caregiver might be deemed to owe a legal duty of care to the dependent, while the dependent may owe a duty of obedience to the caregiver. Such obligations, however, will rarely if ever be involuntary, so long as the caregiver’s sincerely held choice of law is given its due weight in the analysis determining the law to be applied. Voluntary servitude does not offend classical libertarian principles. Voluntary law, however, may provide a means for guardians to legally enforce obligations of care under circumstances when the caregiver seeks to renounce obligations that he or she has previously undertaken. Likewise, legal enforcement of the duty to obey may be exercised in the case of dependents who wish to receive the benefits of the caregiver’s duty of care. If a dependent is able to emancipate himself or herself from a caregiver, she is always free to do so, consistent with classical libertarian principles. However, a caregiver who by adoption of law has undertaken a duty of care to a dependent child can be legally required to honor that duty until the time of emancipation.
Promissory estoppel as known in the common law of contracts may exist when the promises of a person create detrimental reliance by another. This concept may be extended to “promises” implied by publicly adopting a law. Suppose, by example, that a prospective father adopts a law under which he recognizes a legal obligation to support any natural offspring or adopted child until the age of eighteen or until emancipated, whichever is earlier. While holding to this law he attracts a mate, who bears him a son. Suppose the father then renounces his earlier law and adopts a new law without any legal obligations for child support. If it can be shown that the mother relied on his law providing for an obligation of support in deciding to mate with him, the father may be said to be estopped from escaping the duty he had previously proclaimed openly. Under voluntary law, the analysis can be directly based on the relevant time for the applicable law; there is no need to make a specific finding of estoppel, although it may be implied under such facts. The relevant time for choice of law can be found to be the time that the son is conceived, because all the obligations of the father arise from the act of inseminating the mother under conditions in which he held to a law that obligated him to child support. So long as the mother held and holds to a law obligating her also to child support, she has a legally enforceable claim for child support against the father. If the mother hypocritically disclaims support obligations, she cannot claim more from the father than she is willing to provide herself.
Thus, when both parents acknowledge an obligation of support, voluntary law may provide similar but hopefully more efficient and individually tailored outcomes than we are accustomed to under some state-imposed family laws. When one or both parent have by adoption of law disclaimed child support obligations at the time a child is conceived, voluntary law will provide a different outcome. If one parent only has adopted support obligations while the other has disclaimed (or has not adopted) such obligations, the parent without obligations cannot enforce obligations against the other parent. A guardian may step in to enforce the dependent’s rights against the supporting parent only, under the dependent’s imputed law. In such case support would be paid in trust to the dependent only, not to the other parent. Naturally, any person considering parenting a child would be prudent to investigate the law of the other parent before proceeding to conception.
If both parents disclaim or do not acknowledge support obligations at the time of conception, can a guardian of a dependent child legally enforce support obligations on the child’s behalf? It will depend on the circumstances, but in general the answer is no. But neither will any parent be able to prevent the guardian from intervening and assuming caretaker status. Under an imputed law analysis, no rational person in a state of dependency would accept any claim or duty of obedience to a person who disclaims all duties of support. Thus, if both parents disclaim support from before conception, they will not have any legal right to assume the exclusionary privileges of a caretaker with respect to the child, unless they adopt the attendant obligations of child support in a timely manner. If imputing law to a child has any consistent result, it is certainly this: there can be no parental rights where there are no acknowledged parental obligations.
The extent of those obligations may vary based on voluntary law. Nothing requires an absolute obligation of support, regardless of consequences. For example, the parent’s law may provide that they are not legally required to sacrifice their survival for the survival of the child, or to do without basic comforts or medical care to provide every possible opportunity to the child. Elegant expression of such limits may be left to the unlimited creativity of the writers of voluntary law. Perhaps some will be inspired by the ancient Golden Rule, and provide that the duty of care owed by the caregiver to the dependent, or the parent to the child, is equal to caregiver’s duty to care for herself, neither greater nor less.
Being without legally enforceable support obligations to a helpless dependent does not equate to no obligations at all. Nearly everyone’s law will include some duty of care to helpless persons. For example, if a person faints suddenly in the middle of the road, most would recognize a legal duty of others to exercise due care to avoid running them over. These principles are well known in tort law, sometimes expressed as a duty to not create an unreasonable risk to others. While some may disclaim such basic social obligations, they would be foolish to do so, both because it would greatly harm their reputations, and put them at greater risk of harm from others. In the case of the helpless infant or child, such widely recognized duties would ensure that the parents locate a willing caretaker for the child before abandoning it, at least under normal circumstances in which some willing caretaker can reasonably be found. Since there is no legal penalty for abandoning a child so long as a willing and capable caretaker can be found, the parents would not fear legal repercussions, and could openly seek a caretaker to assume responsibility. In normal times, willing caretakers could easily be found. Under circumstances of extreme stress, such as during widespread prolonged famine or military attack, legal duties of support have little meaning anyway, and difficult choices must be made.
When the dependent outlaw commits some harm against another, what is the law applied? For this particular class of problems, there will be little controversy in selecting the weakest law from law of the caregiver and the law of the injured person, using a TROTWET analysis. In most cases, the laws at play will call for restorative damages that the caregiver in the dependent relationship would be liable for anyway. Few would disclaim such liability, lest they also lose timely recourse for harms committed by the children of others. However, if the prevailing law does disclaim liability for the caregiver, liability for damages would fall to the child, under the law of the child as determined by the jurist. Collection of the liability could be postponed until the child is reasonably able to earn money for paying a judgment. The child would be eager to repay its debts, if it wished to participate as a reputable member of the larger society. The child would find it difficult to establish a good reputation without showing that it has paid, or is in process of repaying, for debts arising from its own misconduct. In the case of the most serious offenses, for example, murder, the fate of the child will depend on the findings of the jurist and the three principal factors previously discussed: community norms, the involved persons adopted laws, and the perspective of the dependent. The child may receive a lighter penalty for her dependent status, or not: the outcome will depend on the context of the case.
In the case of abandoned dependents, a similar analysis applies. The imputed laws of the dependent are paramount, and the role of the jurist in identifying the law to be imputed is magnified. Capable parties in such action will be those with an interest in the welfare of the dependent, and any accused of shirking their responsibilities. There will always be at least one party acting as a guardian, or the matter will not appear before a jurist. If there is no parent or family member interested and able to take on the obligations of a caregiver, this role will be assigned to a friend of the family or even to a stranger, based on the determination of the jurist. In any prosperous society, there will be intense competition for caregiver roles of young, non-disabled children, because of the social security afforded by the caregiver-dependent relationship. In the absence of the state, one’s prosperity and security in old age may come to depend on one’s social status, of which membership in a large extended family will be an important part.
Even older dependents or disabled dependents will not lack options, which may be better that what can be provided by state central planning. Older children without caregivers will arrive in such a condition by a diverse array of events, for example, a long period of undiscovered abuse by a caregiver, a rare tragedy wiping out the child’s family, or misconduct on the part of the dependent causing them to be abandoned. Likewise, disabled children will suffer from diverse disabilities. The point being that there are no “one size fits all” solutions to these unfortunate situations and each case needs to be considered on its own merits.
Consider some of the various possibilities. In the case of disabled dependents whose caregivers lack the financial means, but not the will, to care for the disabled dependent to the extent the law imputed to the defendant requires, contributions for support can be solicited from various charitable sources. Such charitable sources would certainly exist in a voluntary law society, in which a good reputation is more desirable than gold. Some such sources would be involved in research for curing or coping with the disabled conditions, and others would support such care out of their general charitable mission. If the caregivers lack both the means and the will to provide care, the situation would be much the same, with the exception that caregiver privileges could be assigned to another person.
In the case of a rare tragedy wiping out a dependent’s caregivers, new caregivers could easily be found. Such stranded dependents are nearly as desirable as young children, and in some cases more desirable, because they may have a record of prior good conduct that reduces the inherent risk of accepting responsibility for a dependent. In a voluntary law society, slight needs come with slight responsibilities, and every good deed enhances the reputation of the giver. Many would find themselves blessed to provide care for such unfortunates.
The older dependent with a record of misconduct would face the least favorable options from the short-term perspective of the dependent, but even these options would be better than can be provided by a state under centralized political authority. With a young offender, there is a greater chance of rehabilitation than an older person. In a free society, markets will exist to meet the natural demand for managing troubled teens in a way that produces positive outcomes. The most difficult teens are often the brightest and most energetic, and institutions with effective programs would produce their share of illustrious alumni. Most of these alumni superstars would support the institutions that helped them in their time of need. Not only so, many wealthy parents with difficult teenagers would pay dearly to send their children to such institutions. These institutions for human development of troubled youth would compete to take in troubled youths who lack caregivers of means, because doing so enhances their reputations for success as well as for compassion, and adds to the talent pool for development of successful, motivated alumni.
Where caregivers of means are available, a jurist may require them to send the dependent to an institution, and to pay the institution’s tuition charges, per the law imputed to the dependent. Caregivers may ignore a jurist’s ruling without fear that their child will be kidnapped by the institution, with rare exceptions when safety of the community requires that a violent youth be deprived of freedom for a while even against the caregiver’s wishes. In most cases, however, the caregiver will consent to temporary incarceration of a youth with a record of harming others, to manage liability for the harm that the dependent youth may do to others in the future, and for the youth’s own protection. If the jurist is of good reputation, and the dependent decides of her own will to attend the institution, the caregiver will receive an invoice for the tuition that cannot ignored without damaging caregiver’s credit rating or creating a risk of collection action. On the other hand, if the caregiver forcibly prevents the dependent from attending the institution, the caregiver will be liable for any resulting damages that accrue to the dependent, or that the dependent inflicts on others, during the remainder of its dependency. Accordingly, whenever a guardian has sued for an order admitting a dependent to an institution for restoring the reputation of a youth, diligent caregivers will work assiduously with the jurist to identify a solution that complies with the law imputed to the dependent and is mutually satisfactory for all people involved in the controversy, if possible. Jurists in these cases would likely come to resemble family counsellors possessing a degree of social power to motivate cooperation from the family members appearing before them.
The principle of imputed laws for dependent outlaws can be applied to treatment of abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia under voluntary law. These subjects will be considered in a following post.
It may not take a village to raise a child, but the environment in which a dependent is raised, including its “village,” may become a factor in the determination of the laws that should be applied to achieve justice in the dependent’s case. The call for objective determination of the law of the dependent arises naturally from the bedrock of personal sovereignty. This determination will require the insights of neutral, informed, compassionate and wise jurists. Caregivers are generally the most important pillars of their dependent’s community, but in no case are they to be considered tyrants over their dependents, lest the core principle of personal sovereignty for every person be subverted.